Supermodular mechanism design by Mathevet, Laurent A.
Theoretical Economics 5 (2010), 403–443 1555-7561/20100403
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Laurent Mathevet
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This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the
multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded ra-
tionality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e.,
mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear
environments, I prove that if a social choice function can be implemented by a
mechanism that generates bounded strategic substitutes—as opposed to strate-
gic complementarities—then this mechanism can be convertedinto a supermod-
ular mechanism that implements the social choice function. If the social choice
function also satisﬁes some efﬁciency criterion, then it admits a supermodular
mechanism that balances the budget. Building on these results, I address the
multiple equilibrium problem. I provide sufﬁcient conditions for a social choice
function to be implementable with a supermodular mechanism whose equilibria
are contained in the smallest interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This
is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique equilib-
rium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation
in environments with general preferences.
Keywords. Implementation, mechanisms, multiple equilibrium problem, learn-
ing, strategic complementarities, supermodular games.
JEL classification. C72, D78, D83.
1. Introduction
For the economist designing contracts, taxes, or other institutions, there is a dilemma
between the simplicity of a mechanism and the multiple equilibrium problem. On the
one hand, simple mechanisms often restrict attention to the “right” equilibria. In public
good contexts, for example, most tax schemes overlook inefﬁcient equilibrium situa-
tions, provided that one equilibrium outcome is a social optimum. On the other hand,
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elaborate mechanisms guarantee that all equilibria yield a desired outcome, but they
often are unreasonably complex. Why would agents play the right equilibrium or how
could they play an equilibrium of a game they may not understand? The question of
equilibrium playinmechanismdesign combinesthemultipleequilibriumproblemand
bounded rationality. If agents are fully rational and knowledgeable, then equilibrium
play is not an issue; however, there are many design problems where these assumptions
are too strong. Unfortunately, while some mechanisms solve the multiplicity problem,
many do not stand up to departures from full rationality.1
In this paper, I develop supermodular mechanism design. This approach is a tool
for constructing mechanisms that lead the agents to play supermodular games. These
mechanisms, which I call “supermodular mechanisms,” are both equipped to handle
the multiple equilibrium problem, and robust to bounded rationality.
Supermodularmechanismsprovideawaytoaddressthemultipleequilibriumprob-
lem. In these mechanisms, agents’ strategies are complements, meaning that an agent
wantstotakeahigherstrategywhenothersdothesame. InviewofMilgromandRoberts
(1990),supermodularmechanismshaveextremalequilibria,andtheintervalinbetween
gives the amplitude of the multiple equilibrium problem. Using this interval, it be-
comes possible to minimize the multiplicity problem, to measure it, and sometimes
to solve it. This paper describes how to build supermodular mechanisms where this
interval and so the multiplicity problem are minimized. It also uncovers a method for
approximating and computing this interval, thereby measuring the multiplicity prob-
lem. This is particularly useful for measuring the welfare loss from agents playing an
unintended equilibrium. Finally, it gives sufﬁcient conditions for equilibrium unique-
ness.
Supermodularmechanismsarerobusttoboundedlyrationalbehaviors. Theinterval
between the extremal equilibria contains all the iteratively undominated strategy pro-
ﬁles, and all the limit points of adaptive and sophisticated learning dynamics (Milgrom
and Roberts 1990, 1991).2 These theoretical properties are corroborated by strong ex-
perimental evidence, showing how convergence to the equilibrium is signiﬁcantly bet-
ter for supermodular games. Chen and Gazzale (2004) run experiments on a game for
which they control supermodularity. They show how convergence in that game is strik-
ingly better when it is supermodular. Healy (2006) tests ﬁve public goods mechanisms
and observes that subjects learn to play the equilibrium only in those mechanisms that
induce a supermodular game.3 As such, supermodular mechanisms contribute to ﬁll
t h eg a pi nt h el i t e r a t u r ee m p h a s i z e db yJackson (2001): “Issues such as how well various
mechanisms perform when players are not at equilibrium but learning or adjusting are
1Theoretical works by Muench and Walker (1983), Cabrales (1999), and Cabrales and Ponti (2000)s h o w
that learning and stability may be serious issues in the Groves–Ledyard (1977), Abreu–Matsushima (1994),
and Sjöström (1994), mechanisms. Healy (2006) and Chen and Tang (1998) provide experimental evidence
that convergence of learning dynamics may fail in various mechanisms, such as Proportional Tax or the
paired-difference mechanism.
2Vives (1990) reports a related result for learning à la Cournot.
3Experiments on the Groves–Ledyard mechanism establish that convergence is far better when some
parameter is high, values at which the mechanism is supermodular (Chen and Plott 1996, Chen and Tang
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quiteimportant[...] andyethavenotevenbeentouchedbyimplementationtheory .
[This topic] has not been looked at from the perspective of designing mechanisms to
have nice learning or dynamic properties.” There are many examples where supermod-
ular mechanisms could be used to approach an objective through iterations: a principal
designing supermodular contracts to approach revenue maximization, a government
applying a supermodular tax system to approach the efﬁcient public goods level, the
trafﬁcauthoritiessettinguptollsystems(Sandholm2002,2005)tominimizecongestion,
and so forth.4
Supermodular games are also attractive in an implementation framework, because
their mixed strategy equilibria are locally unstable under monotone adaptive dynam-
ics, such as Cournot dynamics and ﬁctitious play (Echenique and Edlin 2004). Ruling
out mixed strategy equilibria is common in implementation theory and often arbitrary,
but it is sensible in supermodular implementation. To the contrary, many pure-strategy
equilibria are stable. In a parameterized supermodular game, all equilibria that are in-
creasing in the parameter are stable, such as the extremal equilibria (Echenique 2000).
In quasilinear environments, I develop the theory of supermodular mechanism de-
sign along three types of results. First, I show that many social choice functions can
be implemented with a supermodular mechanism. Essentially, all social choice func-
tions for which strategic substitutability—as opposed to strategic complementarity—is
bounded are supermodular implementable; this class includes all twice-continuously
differentiable social choice functions and all social choice functions on ﬁnite type
spaces. The result is established by turning an existing mechanism into one that in-
duces a supermodular game. The transformation technique is constructive and simple,
yet powerful. I explain it in the next section in a public goods example. A function is
added to each agent’s transfer. These functions turn the agents’ announcements into
complements and they vanish in expectation; thus the original equilibrium remains af-
ter adding the functions, and implementability prevails.
Second, I prove that (under bounded substitutes) if there are at least three agents
and if the social choice function satisﬁes some efﬁciency criterion, then it is imple-
mentable by a supermodular mechanism that balances budget. Budget balancing re-
quires that there be no transfers into or out of the system, which is important for full
efﬁciency. Achieving budget balancing is difﬁcult under dominant-strategy implemen-
tation (Green and Laffont 1979), but possible under Bayesian implementation (Arrow
1979, d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet 1979). When there are three or more agents, bal-
ancing transfers under supermodular implementation is nearly as general as Bayesian
implementation allows.
Interestingly, there are cases where dominant-strategy implementation cannot bal-
ancethebudget,whereasitispossibletobalancethebudgetandinduceasupermodular
game with a unique equilibrium.
Third, I deal with the multiple equilibrium problem. I show that if a social choice
functionsatisﬁessomebasicsmoothnessproperties,thenitisimplementablewithasu-
permodular mechanism whose equilibria are contained in the smallest interval among
4Other examples include a procurement department running an auction to allocate jobs, a group of
scientists creating a control system for planetary exploration vehicles (see Parkes 2004, Tumer and Wolpert
2004 for issues related to cognitive intelligence).406 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
all supermodular mechanisms. This result applies to all social choice functions that are
twice-differentiable and depend on types through an aggregate. The proof relies on de-
signingasupermodularmechanismthatgeneratestheweakestcomplementarities. The
interval between the extremal equilibria will be shown to decrease with the amount of
complementarities, hence such a mechanism produces the tightest interval. The main
interest of a “small” interval is that it leads agents to play a proﬁle whose outcome is
close to the desired outcome. Furthermore, I give sufﬁcient conditions for equilibrium
uniqueness. The game is thus dominance-solvable and all learning dynamics converge
to the equilibrium. As a by-product, it implies coalition-proof Nash implementation by
Milgrom and Roberts (1996). Finally, this paper offers an explicit method for computing
bounds on the equilibrium set, which is useful when the uniqueness conditions do not
hold. This allows us to measure how serious is the multiple equilibrium.
The theory applies broadly to well known models with quasilinear preferences:
Public goods (Section 3), principal multiagents (Section 8.1), auctions, and bargaining
(Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983, Section 8.2). For example, I present an application to
team production where a principal contracts with two agents to maximize net proﬁts.
The social choice function is uniquely supermodular implementable. This paper also
considers (in Section 7) approximate implementation to extend the applicability of the
framework. The objective becomes to supermodularly implement social choice func-
tions that are arbitrarily close to the “target social choice function.” It turns out that
most bounded social choice functions admit nearby social choice functions that are su-
permodular implementable.
Finally, this paper provides a revelation principal for supermodular mechanism de-
sign. Itsaysthatifthereisamechanismthatsupermodularlyimplementsasocialchoice
function and if the range of the equilibrium strategies in the desired equilibrium has a
particularstructure—lattice—thenthereisadirectmechanismthatsupermodularlyim-
plements that social choice function truthfully. The existence of a revelation principle
for supermodular implementation is a particularly relevant question to examine, be-
cause the paper limits attention to direct mechanisms and because the space of mech-
anisms to consider is very large. This allows us to identify situations where direct mech-
anisms cause no loss of generality and when they do, which restrictions they impose.
Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows. Thenextsectionisaliteraturere-
view. Section 3 presents the leading public goods example. Section 4 lays out the frame-
workofsupermodularmechanismdesign. Section5containsthemainresults. Section8
providesseveralapplicationsofthetheorytotraditional modelsandintroducesapprox-
imatesupermodularimplementation. Section 9.1 presentsthesupermodularrevelation
principle. Finally, Section 9.2 discusses issues related to dominant strategies and the in-
terpretation of learning in Bayesian games.
2. Literature review
There are a number of papers related to robustness issues in mechanism design such
as equilibrium multiplicity or learning. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) show that for any
social choice function, there exist arbitrarily close social choice functions that can beTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 407
implemented by iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Although their re-
sult is strong and general,5 their mechanism remains too complex. As nearby social
choice functions get closer to the desired one, the dimension of the message space goes
to inﬁnity, and more steps of iterated deletion are necessary to reach the equilibrium.
Furthermore, theAbreu–Matsushima mechanismdoesnot perform wellin experiments
(Sefton and Yava¸ s 1996). In contrast, this paper studies exact implementation with di-
rect mechanisms for which there is experimental support. Supermodular mechanisms
are, at least, a simple way to obtain dominance properties and a valuable alternative to
more complex mechanisms in many situations.
Chen (2002) provides one of the ﬁrst papers explicitly aimed at improving learning
in mechanism design. In a complete information environment with quasilinear util-
ities, she constructs a mechanism that Nash implements Lindahl allocations and in-
duces a supermodular game. My paper introduces supermodular implementation in
Bayesian contexts and generalizes Chen’s result in incomplete information. Cabrales
(1999)a n dSerrano and Cabrales (2007) study implementation with boundedly rational
agents. The learning dynamics they consider require players to strictly randomize over
all improvements on past play.6 This rules out many natural dynamics considered here.
There are also general impossibility results related to stability in Nash implementation
(Jordan 1986, Kim 1986).
The existing literature on robustness uses methodologies that differ from the
methodologyofthispaper. Mostapproachesrelyonequilibriumconcepts, suchasEliaz
(1999)a n dSaijo et al. (2005). Instead, this paper adopts the methodology advocated in
Jackson (1992),whichrestrictstheclassofadmissiblemechanisms,givenasolutioncon-
cept. The solution concept adopted in the paper is weak—Bayesian equilibrium—and
the focus is on supermodularity. Similarly, Sandholm (2002, 2005) uses implementation
in potential games to obtain evolutionary properties of the mechanism.
3. Motivation and intuition
This section provides a simple economic example where the natural mechanism to
use—theexpectedexternalitymechanismofArrow(1979)andd’AspremontandGérard-
Varet (1979)—has poor properties: It is not dominance-solvable and convergence to the
equilibrium fails under many dynamics. In contrast, the resulting supermodular mech-
anism has a unique globally stable equilibrium and is dominance-solvable.
Consider a principal who needs to decide the level of a public good, such as public
safety or the time or money spent on some event. Let X =[ 0 2] denote the possible
values of the public good. There are two agents, 1 and 2, whose type spaces are  1 =
 2 ⊂[ 0 1]. Types are independently uniformly distributed. The agents’ preferences are
quasilinear, ui(x θi) = Vi(x θi) + ti,w h e r ex ∈ X, θi ∈  i,a n dti ∈ R is the transfer from
5Thesolutionconceptisstrongenoughtopredictconvergenceofmanylearningdynamicstotheunique
equilibrium outcome (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1991). Note, however, that some adaptive dynamics
from Milgrom and Roberts (1990) do not converge to a uniquely rationalizable proﬁle.
6This feature allows players to exit the integer or modulo game.408 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
the principal to agent i. The valuation functions are V1(x θ1) = θ1x−x2 and V2(x θ2) =
θ2x+x2/2.
The principal wishes to make an allocation-efﬁcient decision, i.e., she aims to max-
imize the sum of the valuation functions by choosing x∗(θ) = θ1 + θ2. To this end, she
wants the agents to reveal their true type. She opts for the expected externality mecha-
nism, which gives the transfers7
t1(ˆ θ1  ˆ θ2) = 1
2 + 1
2 ˆ θ2 + ˆ θ2
2 + ˆ θ1 + 1
2 ˆ θ2
1 t 2(ˆ θ1  ˆ θ2) =− t1(ˆ θ1  ˆ θ2) 
Given these transfers, agent i’s expected utility in the mechanism is
E[ui]=−1
2 ˆ θ2
i +(θi +Bi)ˆ θi  (1)
where Bi is the expectation of a function of j’s strategy. From (1), i’s best response is
to announce θi + Bi,w h e r eBi can be interpreted as agent i’s bias for over- or under-
reporting. The only strategic variable is the bias, because only biases depend on what
the opponent does. It turns out that an agent’s bias depends on her opponent’s strategy
through her bias only:
B1 ≈− 2B2 B 2 ≈ B1  (2)
Agent 2 wants the same bias as agent 1, whereas 1 wants an opposite bias. This game
has a ﬂavor of “matching pennies,” because one agent essentially tries to match another
agent who tries to mismatch.
Although truthtelling is an equilibrium,8 it is unclear whether and how the agents
arriveatthatequilibrium. Forthesakeofargument, consideragamewith integerbiases
and best responses described by (2). Such a game cannot be dominance-solvable. Thus
the epistemic conditions that would guarantee that agents play truthfully are too strong
for many design settings. Furthermore, a study of stability will reveal that truthtelling
also has scant dynamic foundations, because many learning dynamics fail to converge.
Consider a learning model (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) applied to the game in-
duced by the mechanism. Time proceeds in discrete periods. At each period, both
agents look at the past history of play, use this to formulate beliefs on the other agent’s
futurestrategy,andthenannounceabestresponse(fullycharacterizedbyabias)totheir
beliefs.9 For simplicity, think of the equivalent situation where agents announce a bias
at each period. For each t ∈ N, a learning rule for agent i, such as ﬁctitious play, takes as
input the history of biases (of agent j)f r o m0t ot − 1 and produces beliefs about which
biases agent j will announce at t. Given these beliefs, agent i (myopically) chooses an
optimal bias.
There are many learning rules for which, not only do the agents not converge to
truth-revealing, but the play cycles forever. First, this is the case for weighted ﬁctitious
7This mechanism allows truthful implementation of allocation-efﬁcient decision rules (see Arrow 1979,
d’AspremontandGérard-Varet1979,orSection23.DinMas-Colelletal.1995),i.e., truthtellingisaBayesian
equilibrium of the mechanism.
8Note that null biases, B1 = B2 = 0, are best responses to each other.
9Alternatively, we could think of a situation where types are drawn independently every period and
agents announce a type rather than a strategy.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 409
play (see, e.g., Ho 2008).10 This is also the case for Cournot dynamics, where cycling
prevails wherever the dynamic starts (except truthtelling); for this dynamic the slight-
est belief perturbations destabilize the truthful equilibrium. Cycling also plagues many
families of dynamics with a longer memory. For example, consider dynamics where
players remember the last T periods. They assign a probability π to the strategy played
at t − 1 and assign (1 − π)δk/C to the strategy played at t − k, k = 2     T,w h e r eC is
normalized so that the probabilities add up to 1. Simulations reveal that learning can
fail under many values of the parameters. For T ∈{ 2 3} δ=  9,a n dπ ≥  5,t h ep r o c e s s
enters a cycle for many starting points. Increasing the memory size does not always im-
prove learning. For T = 4 δ=  8,a n dπ ≤  65, the proﬁle converges to the truthful equi-
librium, but it cycles for π ≥  7. A larger memory does not necessarily improve learning,
because cycling reappears when T ={ 5 6} δ=  8,a n dπ ≤  65. At last, cycling is also an
issue for sophisticated learning dynamics (Milgrom and Roberts 1991).
To ﬁx the problem, this paper advocates converting the mechanism into one that
induces a supermodular game. In this example, the budget balancing assumption is
dropped, but it will be treated in the main text.
Themaininsightistousetransferstoalignagents’biasesbycreatingcomplementar-
ities between their announcements. Say that from agent i’s viewpoint, j reports a large
type if j’s reported type exceeds the average (truthful) type: ˆ θj ≥ Eθj[θj]. By appending
ρi ˆ θi(ˆ θj −Eθj[θj]) with ρi > 0 to the original transfers,
tSM
i (ˆ θ) = Eθj[ti(ˆ θi θj)]+ρi ˆ θi(ˆ θj −Eθj[θj])  (3)
agent i receives an extra reward for announcing large types when j does so as well (ˆ θj ≥
Eθj[θj]) and she is taxed if she still reports large types when j does not (ˆ θj <E θj[θj]).
Parameter ρi captures the intensity of the punishment or reward. Intuitively, there
should be ρi large enough such that both agents want to bias their report in the same
direction, because the reward (punishment) for (not) conforming to their opponent
becomes high, regardless of the original incentives. By doing so, the mechanism has
actually become supermodular. Note ∂2tSM
i (ˆ θ)/∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj = ρi.I f∂2Vi(xi(ˆ θ) θi)/∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj is
bounded below, a condition called bounded substitutes, then there is ρi large enough
such that




i (ˆ θi  ˆ θj)
∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj
≥ 0 for all ˆ θ θi  (4)
which means that the game is supermodular.11
10To apply this model here, type spaces need to be ﬁnite, so that strategy spaces are also ﬁnite. The
results are given for types in {0  5 1}. Strategies are initially assigned arbitrary weights, and beliefs are
updated each period by multiplying all weights by 1 − π, 0 <π<1, and by adding 1 to the weight of the
opponent’s strategy that was played last.
11If the complete information payoffs deﬁne a supermodular game for each θ ∈  , then the (ex ante)
Bayesian game is supermodular. Loosely speaking, supermodular games are characterized by compact
strategyspacesandutilityfunctionswhosecross-partialderivativesbetweenownactionandothers’actions
are positive.410 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Truthtelling was an equilibrium of the original mechanism, and so it must still be
an equilibrium under the modiﬁed mechanism, because it has left the expected utility
functions unchanged: Eθj[tSM
i (· θj)]=Eθj[ti(· θj)]. Furthermore, there exist ρ1 and ρ2
for which this is the unique equilibrium (Theorem 5 of Section 6). Supermodular games
with a unique equilibrium are dominance-solvable, most learning dynamics converge
to the equilibrium, and the equilibrium is stable.
4. Supermodular mechanism design:T he framework
4.1 The environment
Consider n agents, each endowed with quasilinear preferences over a set of alterna-
tives. An alternative is a vector (x t) = (x1     xn t1     tn),w h e r exi is an element
of a compact set Xi ⊂ Rmi and ti ∈ R for all i. In this environment, xi is interpreted as
agent i’s allocation and ti is the money transfer i receives. Each agent i has a compact
type space  i ⊂ R (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) endowed with the usual order and information is
incomplete. There is a common prior with density φ on   known to the mechanism
designer. Types are assumed to be independently distributed and φ has full support.
Each agent i’s preferences over alternatives are represented by a bounded utility func-
tion ui(xi ti θi) = Vi(xi θi) + ti,w h e r eVi:Xi ×  i → R is a bounded function called i’s
valuation.
A mechanism designer wishes to implement an allocation for each realization of
types. This objective is represented by a decision rule x:   → (xi(θ))i. To this end, the
designer sets up a transfer scheme ti:  → R for each i. A mechanism is denoted by   =
({ i} (x t))anditdescribesthestrategicsituationintowhichagentsareput. Agentsare
askedtoannounceatype;fromthevectorofannouncedtypes,anallocationandatrans-
feraccruetoeachagent.12 Thepairf = (x t) iscalledasocialchoicefunction. Letting ˆ θi
be i’s announced type, i’s (ex post) utility function in   is u 
i (ˆ θ θi) = Vi(xi(ˆ θ) θi)+ti(ˆ θ).
A pure strategy for agent i under incomplete information is a function ˆ θi: i →  i that
maps true types into announced types. Strategy ˆ θi(·) is called a deception. Agent i’s (ex
ante) utility function in   is U 
i (ˆ θi(·)  ˆ θ−i(·)) = Eθ[u (ˆ θ(θ) θi)].
This paper is concerned with supermodular mechanisms. To deﬁne these mecha-
nisms, several deﬁnitions are in order. A function g:R×Rn−1 → R such that g:(y z)  →
g(y z) has increasing (decreasing) differences in (y z) if, whenever y ≥ y  and z ≥ z ,
g(y z)−g(y  z)≥ (≤)g(y z )−g(y  z ); g satisﬁes the single-crossing property in (y z)
if, whenever y ≥ y  and z ≥ z , g(y z ) ≥ g(y  z ) implies g(y z) ≥ g(y  z)and g(y z )>
g(y  z ) implies g(y z)>g(y  z).I fg has decreasing differences in (y z), then variables
y and z are said to be substitutes. If g has increasing differences or satisﬁes the single-
crossing property in (y z),t h e ny and z are said to be complements.
Ag a m ei sat u p l e(N {Si ui}),w h e r eN is a ﬁnite set of players; each i ∈ N has a
strategy space Si ⊂ R and a payoff function ui:
 
i∈N Si → R. Generic elements of Si are
denoted si and s−i = (s1     si−1 si+1     sn). Subsets of the real line are endowed with
the Euclidean topology.
12Most of the paper is concerned with direct mechanisms.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 411
Definition 1. A game G = (N {Si ui}) is supermodular if, for all i ∈ N, the following
statements hold.
(i) Space Si ⊂ R is compact.
(ii) Payoff ui is bounded, and has increasing differences in (si s−i).
(iii) Payoff ui is upper semicontinuous in si for each s−i and continuous in s−i for
each si.
There are three stages at which it is relevant to formulate the game induced by
mechanism  : ex ante, interim, and ex post (complete information). Let G(θ) =
(N { i u 
i (· θi)}) be the game induced by mechanism   ex post. Let G = (N { 
 i
i  U 
i })
be the ex ante Bayesian game induced by  . Among these three formulations of the
game, the paper considers supermodularity at the ex post level, because this is the
strongest requirement. If the ex post game is always supermodular, then the game will
be supermodular in its ex ante and interim formulations.
Definition 2. A social choice function f = (x t) is (truthfully) supermodular imple-
mentableiftruthtelling, i.e., ˆ θi(θi) = θi forall i, isaBayesianequilibriumof G andif G(θ)
is supermodular for each θ.
4.2 Payoff assumptions
Thissectioncontainsthemainassumptionsonpayoffsthatareusedthroughoutthepa-
per. Most deﬁnitions impose conditions on the composition of the valuation functions
and the decision rule.
As suggested in Section 3, the intuition behind most results is that transfers should
add complementarities to compensate for the substitute effects coming from the valu-
ation functions. To be able to compensate, these substitute effects should be bounded:
∂2Vi(xi(ˆ θ) θi)/∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj ≤ Ti for all ˆ θ and θi. Given that the type sets are compact, this as-
sumption is trivially satisﬁed if the valuation functions and the decision rule are twice-
continuously differentiable.13
It will be useful to generalize the previous condition to nondifferentiable environ-
ments. For any θ  
i  θ 
i θi ∈  i and θ−i ∈  −i,l e t Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ−i θi) = Vi(xi(θ  
i  θ−i) θi) −
Vi(xi(θ 
i θ−i) θi), In general environments, say that the valuation functions and the de-
cisionrulehaveboundedsubstitutesifforeachiandθi,thereisarealnumberTi(θi)such
that  Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi)− Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ 




j =i(θ  
j −θ 
j) for all θ  
i ≥ θ 
i,
θ  
−i ≥ θ 
−i,a n dθi. The valuations and the decision rule generate uniformly bounded
substitutes if the previous inequality admits a uniform lower bound Ti. Note that the
assumption of bounded substitutes is always satisﬁed when type sets are ﬁnite.
Unless otherwise stated, the valuation functions and the decision rule are assumed
to form a continuous family throughout the paper: For all i and θi, Vi(xi(ˆ θ) θi) is con-
tinuous in ˆ θ−i for ﬁxed ˆ θi and Vi(xi(ˆ θ) θi) is upper semicontinuous in ˆ θi for ﬁxed ˆ θ−i.
13The valuation functions and the decision rule are (twice-) continuously differentiable if for all i,t h e r e
exist open sets Oi ⊃  i and Ui ⊃ Xi,s u c ht h a tVi :Ui × Oi → R and xi :
 
i∈N Oi → Ui are (twice-) continu-
ously differentiable.412 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
5. Supermodular implementable social choice functions and
budget balancing
This section delineates the set of supermodular implementable social choice functions
with and without budget balancing. The paper builds on these results to address the
multiple equilibrium problem in the next section.
5.1 A general result
The class of supermodular implementable social choice functions constitutes the start-
ing point of the analysis. The ﬁrst result identiﬁes mild boundedness and continuity
conditions under which the class of supermodular implementable social choice func-
tions is the same as that of implementable social choice functions.
Theorem 1. Suppose the valuation functions and decision rule x generate uniformly
bounded substitutes. Assume Eθ−i[ti(· θ−i)] is upper semicontinuous.
(i) There exist transfers t such that f = (x t) is implementable if and only if there are
transfers tSM such that (x tSM) is supermodular implementable.
(ii) Agents receive the same interim expected utility in equilibrium under (x t) and
(x tSM),a n dEθ−i[ti(· θ−i)]=Eθ−i[tSM
i (· θ−i)].
According to this theorem, if the decision rule and the utility functions are relatively
well behaved in the sense of continuous families and bounded substitutes, then a social
choice function is implementable if and only if it can be converted into a supermodular
implementable social choice function. So the class of supermodular implementable so-
cial choice functions is large. Transfers are at the heart of the result: It is always possible
to add complementarities into the transfers without affecting the incentives that appear
in the expected value. It is also interesting to note that if the original social choice func-
tion f satisﬁes some ex ante or interim participation constraints, then so does (x tSM),
because agents receive the same interim expected utility in equilibrium.
Theassumptionsofuniformlyboundedsubstitutesandcontinuityaregenerallysat-
isﬁed. This is the case when type sets are ﬁnite and in twice-continuously differentiable
environments. This leads to the following important corollaries that cover many cases
of interest.
Corollary 1. Let type spaces be ﬁnite. For any valuation functions, if the social choice
function f = (x t) is implementable, then there exist transfers tSM such that (x tSM) is
supermodular implementable.
Corollary 2. If f = (x t) is an implementable social choice function such that the de-
cision rule x and the valuations are twice-continuously differentiable, then there exist
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Most results in the paper take implementable social choice functions as starting
points, because there exist well known conditions under which a social choice function
is implementable with continuous transfers.14 The next proposition combines Theo-
rem 1 and those implementability conditions.
Proposition 1. Let type spaces be compact intervals. Suppose the decision rule x and
the valuations generate uniformly bounded substitutes. If Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)] is con-
tinuous in (ˆ θi θi) and ∂Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)]/∂θi is increasing in ˆ θi, then there are
transfers tSM such that (x tSM) is supermodular implementable.
In smooth environments, supermodular implementable decision rules are those
rules that lead each agent i’s expected marginal valuation to be nondecreasing.
5.2 Adding the budget constraint
This section investigates supermodular implementation under budget balancing. In
some design problems, the planner should not realize a net gain from the mecha-
nism. Since the planner cannot sustain deﬁcits, this implies that transfers are balanced:  
ti = 0. If a social choice function combines an efﬁcient decision with balanced trans-
fers, then it is fully efﬁcient. That is, it maximizes the sum of the utility functions subject
to feasibility
 
ti ≤ 0. The next example shows that complementarities between agents’
announcements might be irreconcilable with budget balancing.
Example 1. Consider the public goods example of Section 3. In this example, if there
exist transfers {tSM
i (·)}i=1 2 such that the resulting social choice function (x tSM) is su-
permodular implementable, then inequality (4) must hold for both agents. That is, the
cross-partial derivatives of t1(ˆ θ) must be greater than 2 and the cross-partial derivatives
of t2(ˆ θ) must be greater than −1; hence their sum will be strictly greater than 0. The
budgetbalancecondition requires
 
i=1 2ti(ˆ θ) = 0, sothesumofthecross-partial deriv-
ativesofthetransfersmustbenull. Asaresult,budgetbalancingmustbeviolatedinthis
example, if there is supermodular implementation. ♦
This example points to the difﬁculty of balancing the budget in some situations with
two players. The next theorem provides sufﬁcient conditions for supermodular imple-
mentation with balanced transfers with at least three agents. Say that a decision rule x
is allocation-efﬁcient if x(θ) ∈ argmaxx∈X
 
i∈N Vi(xi θi) for all θ ∈  .
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3. Suppose the valuation functions and the decision rule generate
uniformly bounded substitutes. If the decision rule is allocation-efﬁcient, then there are
balanced transfers tBB such that (x tBB) is supermodular implementable.
Basically, if substitutes are bounded, any allocation-efﬁcient decision rule can be
paired with a transfer scheme to give a fully efﬁcient supermodular implementable so-
cial choice function. The proof is constructive and appears in Appendix B.T r a n s f e r s
14See, e.g., Proposition 23.D.2 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) for linear utility functions.414 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
tBB correspond to a transformation of the transfers in the expected externality mecha-
nism (Arrow 1979, d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet 1979). This transformation is similar
to that in Theorem 1, as it adds complementarity between agents’ announcements in
a pairwise fashion. It then becomes possible to subtract from each individual’s trans-
fer those complementarities that come from the other agents’ transfers and that do not
concernthatindividual, thusbalancingthewholesystem. Notethatthistransformation
does not use any agent as a “sink” that absorbs the others’ deﬁcit or surplus; the budget
balancing effort is shared by all. Moreover, not all supermodular transformations would
allow balancing the budget.15
Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatthesesupermodulartransformations,whileleav-
ing the (interim) expected utility unchanged, add risk into the transfers by creating in-
terdependencies between agents. This is particularly noticeable in the above, because
the expected externality mechanism has no interdependencies between agents.
6. Optimal and unique supermodular implementation
This section deals with the multiple equilibrium problem in supermodular implemen-
tation. In Section 3, the linear transformation in (3) is one possible way to obtain a
supermodular mechanism. In general, among all the possible ways to turn a mecha-
nism into a supermodular mechanism, that is, among all supermodular mechanisms
that implement a decision rule, which one has the smallest equilibrium set? This ques-
tion is important, because even if a mechanism has an equilibrium outcome with some
desirable property, it may have other equilibrium outcomes that are undesirable. This
is particularly relevant for supermodular implementation, because the truthful equilib-
rium is the only equilibrium known to have the desired outcome. This section provides
a closed form for the supermodular mechanism whose equilibrium set size is minimal.
If the size of the equilibrium set, called interval prediction, is small, then agents should
playaproﬁleclosetotruthtellingandtothedesiredoutcome. Thissectionalsocontains
conditionsfortruth-revealingtobetheuniqueequilibrium—acaseinwhichsupermod-
ular implementation is particularly powerful.
6.1 Optimal implementation
I begin with an example that explains the foundations of optimal supermodular imple-
mentation. This example suggests that the equilibrium set enlarges as complementar-
ities become stronger. This observation will be the centerpiece of the main result, be-
cause minimizing the size of the equilibrium set then comes down to minimizing the
complementarities, which is more tractable. This key observation warrants a series of
deﬁnitions and a proposition, which lead to the main result.
Example 2. Consider the public goods example of Section 3.I ft r a n s f e r stSM
i , i = 1 2,
are set with ρ1 = 21
2 and ρ2 =−1
2, the game induced by the mechanism is supermodular
15Theorem 2 can be modiﬁed to apply to situations where, for every realization of types, enough taxes
need to be raised to pay the cost of x. This constraint takes the form
 
i∈N ti(θ) ≥ C(x(θ)) for all θ (see
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and truthtelling is the unique equilibrium. For ρ1 = 31
5 and ρ2 = 1
2,t h es u p e r m o d u l a r
induced game now has a smallest and a largest equilibrium. In the smallest equilib-
rium, agent 1 announces 0 for any type below c1 ≈  47 and announces θ1 − c1 for types
above; agent 2 announces 0 for any type below c2 ≈  55 and announces θ2 −c2 for types
above. Inthelargestequilibrium,agent1announcesθ1+c1 foranytypebelow1−c1 and
announces 1 for types above; agent 2 announces θ2 + c2 for any type below 1 − c2 and
announces 1 for types above. By increasing ρ1 to 4 and ρ2 to 1, the following situation
occurs: The smallest equilibrium is now the smallest proﬁle of the entire space (each
agent always announces her smallest type), and the largest equilibrium is the largest
proﬁle (each agent always announces her largest type). Increasing ρ1 and ρ2 has had
three negative consequences: (i) By increasing these parameters above 5/2 and −1/2,
two new equilibria have been generated. By increasing them more, (ii) the interval pre-
diction has enlarged to become the whole space, and (iii) the truthful equilibrium has
become locally unstable. To see this, think of a (symmetric) scenario with an increasing
best response function from [−1 1] into [−1 1]—a mapping from biases into biases—
that intersects the 45-degree line three times. The middle intersection occurs at 0 and
represents the truthtelling equilibrium. Then the extremal equilibria are stable, but the
truthtelling equilibrium is unstable. Most adaptive dynamics starting off the truthful
equilibrium move away from it toward an extremal equilibrium. ♦
One way to measure the degreeof complementarity between the variables of a func-
tion is by looking at its cross-partial derivatives. Large cross-partials mean that the de-
greeofcomplementarityishighandviceversa. InExample2,thedegreeofcomplemen-
tarities of the transfers is ρi. Optimal supermodular implementation involves designing
a mechanism whose induced supermodular game has the weakest complementarities
among all supermodular mechanisms. The rationale behind it is clear from Example 2,
as there is evidence that extremal equilibria move apart with the degree of complemen-
tarities. Thus, optimal implementation should provide the best compromise between
complementarities and equilibrium set size.
As mentioned above, the cross-partial derivatives offer a way to measure comple-
mentaritiesintwice-differentiableenvironments. Itisnaturaltosaythatatransferfunc-
tion ˜ t generates larger complementarities than t, denoted ˜ t  ID t,i f∂2˜ ti(ˆ θ)/∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj ≥
∂2ti(ˆ θ)/∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj for all ˆ θ, j,a n di. The next deﬁnition formalizes this idea and extends
it to nondifferentiable transfers. Let >−i be the product order on Rn−1.
Definition 3. Deﬁne the ordering relation  ID on the space of transfer functions such
that ˜ t  ID t if, for all i ∈ N and for all θ  
i >θ  
i and θ  
−i >−i θ 
−i, ˜ ti(θ  
i  θ  
−i) − ˜ ti(θ  
i  θ 
−i) −
˜ ti(θ 
i θ  
−i)+ ˜ ti(θ 
i θ 
−i) ≥ ti(θ  
i  θ  
−i)−ti(θ  
i  θ 
−i)−ti(θ 




While  ID is transitive and reﬂexive on the space of transfer functions, it is not anti-
symmetric. Consider the set of  ID equivalence classes of transfers, denoted T .16
The next proposition provides the foundations for the deﬁnition of optimal imple-
mentation. It is also interesting in itself for the theory of supermodular games.17 It
16Any quasi-order is transformed into a partial order using equivalence classes.
17See Milgrom and Roberts (1995, pp. 189–190) for a related result.416 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
shows that if a transfer function t   generates more complementarities than a transfer
function t ,t h e nt   induces a game whose interval prediction is larger than the interval
prediction of the game induced by t . As such, the objective of minimizing the comple-
mentarities coincides with the objective of minimizing the interval prediction.
For any t ∈ T and supermodular implementable f = (x t),l e tθt(·) and θt(·) denote
the extremal (Bayesian) equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism.
Proposition 2. Let the decision rule and the valuation functions be such that
Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)] is continuous in (ˆ θi θi). For any supermodular implementable
social choice functions (x t  ) and (x t ),i ft    ID t ,t h e n[θt 
(·) θt 
(·)]⊂[ θt  




the previous proposition, this gives the tightest interval prediction around the truthful
equilibrium among all supermodular mechanisms.
Definition 4. A social choice function f = (x t∗) is optimally supermodular imple-
mentable if it is supermodular implementable and t  ID t∗ for all transfers t ∈ T such
that (x t) is supermodular implementable.
Themaintheoremdetermineswhichdecisionrulesareoptimallysupermodularim-
plementable. The conclusion is rather powerful: In twice-continuously differentiable
environments, all implementable social choice functions whose decision rule satisﬁes
some dimensionality condition are optimally supermodular implementable. This di-
mensionality condition is deﬁned as follows. A decision rule x:   → (xi(θ)) is dimen-
sionallyreducible if,foreachi ∈ N,therearetwice-continuouslydifferentiablefunctions
hi:R2 → Xi and ri: −i → R such that ri(·) is increasing and xi(θ) = hi(θi ri(θ−i)) for all
θ ∈  . The condition is trivially true when there are two individuals. If there are more
than two, a player’s decision rule can depend on her own type directly, but it must de-
pend on her opponents’ types indirectly through a real-valued aggregate.18 Examples 3
and 7 provide examples of dimensionally reducible (and efﬁcient) decision rules.
Theorem 3. Let the valuation functions be twice-continuously differentiable and let
f = (x t) be a social choice function where x is dimensionally reducible. If f is imple-
mentable, then there exist t∗ such that (x t∗) is optimally supermodular implementable.
There are many possible ways to transform a mechanism into a supermodular
mechanism. This section elicits a particular transformation that generates the smallest
equilibrium set among all possible conversions, hence all supermodular mechanisms.
It is worth pointing out that weakening the complementarities does not always slow
down learning; actually the opposite is often true. A “ﬂatter” best response function
increases the rate of convergence toward the equilibrium set.
18Taking types in [0 1], it excludes, for example, x for which x1(θ) = θ
θ2θ3
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6.2 Unique implementation
In this section, I provide sufﬁcient conditions for a social choice function to be uniquely
supermodular implementable. After giving conditions for minimizing the interval pre-
diction, it is natural to study situations where truthtelling is the unique equilibrium.
The induced game is then dominance-solvable and all learning dynamics converge to
the equilibrium. As a by-product, coalition-proof Nash implementation is implied via
Milgrom and Roberts (1996).
Definition 5. A social choice function f is uniquely supermodular implementable if
it is supermodular implementable and the truthful equilibrium is the unique Bayesian
equilibrium.
Before providing the sufﬁcient conditions, some deﬁnitions are in order. The val-
uations and the decision rule have strong differences if, for each i and θi,t h e r ei s
ar e a ln u m b e rγi(θ−i) such that ∂2Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)/∂ˆ θi∂θi ≥ γi(θ−i) for all ˆ θi, θ.I n
the nondifferentiable case, the condition becomes that for all ˆ θ  
i ≥ ˆ θ 
i and θ  
i ≥ θ 
i,
 Vi(ˆ θ  
i   ˆ θ 
i θ−i θ  
i )− Vi(ˆ θ  
i   ˆ θ 
i θ−i θ 
i) ≥ γi(θ−i)(ˆ θ  




The previous condition is derived exogenously from the primitives of the model.
The next condition is determined endogenously from the transfers in the mechanism.
A mechanism   = ({ i} (x t)) generates bounded complements if, for each i and θi,
there is a real number Ki(θi) such that  ui(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi)− ui(θ  
i  θ 
i θ 





j =i(θ  
j −θ 
j) for all θ  
i ≥ θ 
i and θ  
−i ≥ θ 
−i. The mechanism generatesuniformly
bounded complements if there is a uniform upper bound Ki. The valuation functions
and the decision rule are said to generate bounded complements if the mechanism
  = ({ i} (x t0)) generates bounded complements, where t0 is the transfer function
that is identically zero.
6.2.1. Sufﬁcient conditions
The sufﬁcient conditions for unique supermodular implementation are imposed on
am a t r i x ,w h i c hIc a l lt h ematrix of complementarities. To deﬁne this matrix, assume
strong differences and suppose that the mechanism ({ i} f)generates bounded com-
plements (see Section 4). The matrix of complementarities is the n×n matrix whose ith







−Eθ−1[γ1(θ−1)] Eθ1[K1(θ1)] ··· Eθ1[K1(θ1)]
Eθ2[K2(θ2)]− Eθ−2[γ2(θ−2)] ··· Eθ2[K2(θ2)]
     
     
   
     







The matrix of complementarities is determined endogenously by the mechanism
through the bounds on complements (Ki’s). The matrix indicates how sensitive agents
are as a whole to their own type versus their opponents’ announcements. On the one
hand, when the complementarities between own announcement and type are strong418 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
(large E[γ(·)]), agentstendtoannouncehightypesregardlessoftheiropponents’strate-
gies. This favors uniqueness. On the other hand, when the complementarities between
agents’ announcements are strong (large E[K(·)]), it is source of multiplicity. The dom-
inating effect is captured by the deﬁniteness of the matrix of complementarities. If it is
negative-deﬁnite, the ﬁrst effect is stronger. For example, if the sum of the entries on
each row is negative, then the matrix is negative-deﬁnite.
Proposition 3. Let f be a supermodular implementable social choice function. Let the
valuation functions and the decision rule be continuously differentiable. If the matrix of
complementarities is negative-deﬁnite, then f is uniquely supermodular implementable.
The previous proposition is mostly useful a posteriori, that is, after building it, the
designer can check whether the mechanism has a unique equilibrium. But one would
also like to know about the size of the equilibrium set beforehand, based on the primi-
tives of the design problem. The following corollary accomplishes this goal by using the
optimal transfers. Since the optimal transfers are built from the primitives of the model,
they can be used within Proposition 3. Since they give the smallest equilibrium set, they
are the natural candidates to lead to unique implementation.
Corollary 3. Let the valuation functions be twice-continuously differentiable. Let
f = (x t) be an implementable social choice function with a dimensionally reducible de-
cision rule. Denote
Ki(θi) = max










If the matrix of complementarities obtained from (5) is negative-deﬁnite, then there are
transfers t∗ such that (x t∗) is uniquely supermodular implementable.
This corollary points to the heterogeneity of complementarities across types (within
the valuations) as being responsible for multiplicity of equilibria. Since the designer has
to make the induced game supermodular for each realization,19 she may have to add
complementarities for some realizations of types that are unnecessarily high for others,
thus generating multiple equilibria.
Negative-deﬁniteness of the matrix of complementarities is a convenient condition
for unique implementation, but it is not necessary. The gap between necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions is essentially a computational matter. To help close the gap, I provide
a way to compute bounds on the equilibrium set. This gives an alternative method to
checkforuniqueness, butitgoesbeyond, sinceitcanbeusedtogetanideaofthesizeof
the equilibrium set when the uniqueness condition fails. Finding these bounds involves
19It is sufﬁcient but not necessary that the ex post game be supermodular for each realization so that the
ex ante Bayesian game is supermodular. For example, if the prior is mostly concentrated on some subset
   of  , it may not be necessary to make the ex post payoffs supermodular for types in  \  .O fc o u r s e ,t h e
possibility of neglecting  \   depends on how unlikely that set is compared to how submodular the utility
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solving systems of equations formed exclusively from the primitives of the model. For
example, the ability to compute bounds on the equilibrium set is attractive for welfare
analysis, as it becomes possible to measure the maximal loss in efﬁciency caused by the
existence of many equilibria.
Proposition 4. Let f = (x t) be a supermodular implementable social choice function.
Let the valuations and the decision rule be continuously differentiable. Assume bounded
substitutes and suppose mechanism ({ i} f) generates bounded complements. Then
there exist two systems of 2n equations: one whose lowest solution bounds the equilib-
rium set from below; the other whose largest solution bounds the equilibrium set from
above.
These two systems of equations, which ﬁgure in (25)a n d( 27)i nAppendix B,a r e
constructed by approximating the game induced by the mechanism. The approximated
game is a supermodular game whose interval prediction includes the equilibrium set
of the original game. In the approximated game, agents have utility functions that are
quadraticapproximationsoftheirrealutilityfunctions. Hencetheseconditionsarenec-
essary for uniqueness if utilities are indeed quadratic. If types are distributed uniformly,
these systems are simple systems of 2n quadratic equations. Example 3 is an illustration
how useful this method can be.
Example 3. Consider the public goods setting of Section 3 with a third player whose
type is uniformly and independently distributed in [0 1]. Her valuation function is





efﬁcient and dimensionally reducible. The designer can choose the budget balanc-
ing transfers tBB or the optimal transfers t∗. If she prefers full efﬁciency, then she
chooses ρ1 ≥ 8, ρ2 ≥ 5,a n dρ3 ≥ 6,a n dt r a n s f e r stBB. However, the interval prediction
of the resulting game is always the entire space, so she may prefer to minimize the in-





θj). It is easy to check that the corresponding matrix of complemen-
tarities is not negative-deﬁnite. Proposition 4 becomes a crucial tool to ﬁnd bounds on
the equilibrium set. This is done by solving two simple systems of 2n quadratic equa-
tions. The following system corresponds to (27) (see Appendix B) and should be solved
for (Ai Bi)n
i=1:







 i = 1     n







 i = 1     n 
The solution deﬁnes piecewise afﬁne functions according to (26) that are bounds on
the equilibrium set. The solution of the above is roughly (1 1  1)i and that of (25)i s
(1 0)i,whichcorrespondstotruthtelling. Thus,alltheequilibriaarecontainedinasmall420 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
strip below truthtelling. Welfare analysis reveals that proﬁles in that interval prediction
c a na tm o s tr e s u l ti na 03 loss in total utility under the optimal transfers (compared to
truthtelling). ♦
Next I apply the uniqueness results to the leading public goods example, where any
mechanism can be converted into a supermodular mechanism with a unique equilib-
rium, even if the original mechanism has many equilibria. This shows how weak imple-
mentation can be turned into strong implementation.
Example 4. Consider the model of Section 3. If the designer had used transfers ˆ ti(ˆ θ) =
ti(ˆ θ) − 3ˆ θi ˆ θj + 3
2 ˆ θi, i = 1 2, instead of starting with the expected externality transfers,
then she would have induced a game with many equilibria. There are two equilib-
ria where one agent always reports 0 while the other always reports 1. Furthermore,
truthtelling is an unstable equilibrium; any perturbation results in a departure from it.
Yet (x t∗)isuniquelysupermodularimplementable. Toseewhy,note∂xi(θ)/∂θi = 1and
∂2Vi(x θi)/∂x∂θi = 1, which implies γi(θ−i) = 1, i = 1 2. Since ∂2Vi(x(ˆ θ) θi)/∂ˆ θ1∂ˆ θ2 is
constant in θi for i = 1 2, Ki(θi) = 0. Proposition 3 completes the proof. ♦
As a ﬁnal remark on uniqueness, it is worth mentioning that if types are assumed to
beindependent,whichisstandardinmechanismdesign,thentheinformationstructure
can hardly be used as a tool to obtain uniqueness.20 So one has to impose conditions on
payoffs, which necessarily imply a trade-off involving complementarities. The way to
measure complementarities creates a gap between necessity and sufﬁciency. This gap
depends on how tight the bounds on complementarities (Ki’s and γi’s) are.
6.2.2. Unique implementation and full efﬁciency
This section deals with the multiple equilibrium problem under the budget balance
condition. As previous results show, making sure that the equilibrium set is minimal
requires some ﬂexibility in designing the transfers. But this ﬂexibility is not always com-
patible with balancing the budget, as suggested by the functional form of the balanced
transfers. As a result, in some environments (see Example 3 below), there will be a con-
ﬂict between full efﬁciency and robustness. Example 1 already delivered the message:
Sometimes the designer must sacriﬁce one or the other. Either the designer uses the
supermodular mechanism with a unique equilibrium at the price of a balanced budget
(full efﬁciency) or she loses robustness by balancing the budget via the expected exter-
nality mechanism. Nonetheless, there are situations where the design problem admits
a supermodular mechanism with unique equilibrium, and this robustness can be auto-
ﬁnanced by the agents. This is formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Let n ≥ 3. Consider valuation functions and an allocation-efﬁcient de-
cision rule that are continuously differentiable, and generate strong differences. Suppose
that these valuations and the decision rule produce substitutes and complements that
20For example, we cannot use the global games argument of Frankel et al. (2003), which heavily relies on
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are uniformly bounded, respectively, by Ti and τi.I fτi − Ti <E θi[γi(θi)], then there are
balanced transfers tBB such that (x tBB) is uniquely supermodular implementable.
The proposition gives sufﬁcient conditions for the balanced transfers identiﬁed in
Theorem 2 to yield truthtelling as a unique equilibrium. The following example is an
application.
Example 5. Consider the same setting as the public goods example of Section 3 with
an additional player, player 3, whose type is independently distributed from the other
players’typesin 3 =[ 0 1]. Player3’svaluationfunctionis V3(x θ3) = θ3x.L e tX =[ 0 3]
and x(θ) =
 
iθi; x is allocation-efﬁcient and γi(θi) = 1 for all i. The valuations and
the decision rule produce complements and substitutes that admit the same bounds.
Proposition 5 says that there exist {ρi},f o re x a m p l eρi = 1/2 for all i,s u c ht h a t(x tBB) is
uniquely supermodular implementable with a balanced budget. ♦
This paper does not answer, in general, the question of reaching uniqueness and
supermodularity with the budget constraint. This is a difﬁcult issue that requires the
use of more general mechanisms.
7. Approximate supermodular implementation
I generalize some results within the context of approximate (or virtual) implementa-
tion.21 In well behaved environments, the results so far have been quite general. They
apply to a variety of contexts, such as principal multiagent (Section 8) and public goods
models. However, there are interesting situations with discontinuities that fall outside
thescopeofthecurrentresults. Awayaroundthisproblemisapproximateimplementa-
tion; the objective becomes to supermodularly implement (well behaved) social choice
functions that are arbitrarily close to a “target social choice function.” After describ-
ing the failure of bounded substitutes in the basic auction setting, I present results that
accommodate these situations.
Consider the following auction model. There is one unit of an indivisible good to be
allocated among two buyers {1 2} whose types lie in [θ θ]. An outcome is represented
by the vector (x1 x2),w h e r exi = 1 if i gets the good and 0 otherwise. Buyer i’s utility
function is ui(xi θi) = θixi + ti. The allocation-efﬁcient decision rule x∗ attributes the
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2) =− 1. Hence, the assumption of bounded substitutes requires the existence
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unbounded and none of the results applies.
21See Abreu and Matsushima (1992) and Duggan (1997).422 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Clearly, the problem is caused by the lack of smoothness of the decision rule. So the
idea is to approximate the social choice function by smooth implementable functions
that are known to satisfy the desired conditions. Let  ·  p be the Lp norm.
Definition 6. A decision rule x is approximately (optimally) supermodular imple-
mentable if there exists a sequence of (optimally) supermodular implementable social
choice functions {(xn tn)} such that, for 1 ≤ p<∞, limn→∞ xn i −xi p = 0 for all i.
The next results provide conditions so that a social choice function can be ap-
proached by a sequence of supermodular implementable social choice functions. The
intuition is that the space of smooth functions is dense in Lp spaces, hence a smooth
approximation exists for any Lp function. Smooth social choice functions satisfy the
bounded substitutes assumption, so there remains only to establish that incentive com-
patibility can be preserved along the sequence. Furthermore, if the decision rule also
satisﬁes the dimensionality condition from Section 6.1, then it is approachable by social
choice functions whose supermodular game form gives the tightest interval prediction.
Proposition 6. Let the valuation functions be twice-continuously differentiable such
that ∂Vi(xi θi)/∂θi is increasing in xi for all i. If the decision rule is such that xi ∈ Lp is
increasing in ˆ θi for all i, then it is approximately supermodular implementable.
Proposition 7. Let the valuation functions be twice-continuously differentiable such
that ∂Vi(xi θi)/∂θi is increasing in xi for all i. If the decision rule is such that, for all i,
there exist hi:R2 → Xi and ri: −i → R such that
(i) hi is bounded and increasing in its ﬁrst variable
(ii) ri is continuous and strictly increasing22
(iii) xi(θ) = hi(θi ri(θ−i)),
then it is approximately optimally supermodular implementable.
These results apply to many discontinuous models of interest such as public goods,
auctions, and bilateral trading (Section 8). In the above auction, for example, let
ri(θ−i) = max{θj :j  = i},a n dl e thi(θi ri) = 1 if θi >r i, and 0 otherwise. Since all the con-
ditions are satisﬁed, Proposition 7 applies. In addition, these results suggest a dilemma
between close implementability and robustness of equilibrium play. I develop this idea
in Section 10; Section 8.2 provides an illustration.
8. Applications
8.1 Principal–multiagent problem
This section applies the theory to the traditional principal–multiagent problem with
hidden information. A principal contracts with n agents. Agent i’s type lies in [θi θi].
22Function ri is strictly increasing if ri(θ  
−i)>r i(θ 
i) whenever θ  
−i   θ 
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Types are independently distributed according to a common prior. Each agent i exerts
some observable effort xi ∈ Xi and bears a cost ci(xi θi) when her type is θi.F r o ma l l
the efforts x = (x1     xn) and types, the principal receives utility w(x θ). The principal
faces the problem of designing a proﬁt-maximizing contract, subject to incentive and
reservation-utility constraints. A contract is a function that maps types into effort and
transfer levels for each agent. The principal’s problem can be stated as


























ti(θi θ−i)−ci(xi(θi θ−i) θi)
 
≥ ui (9)
for all θi. Condition (8) requires truthtelling to be an equilibrium. Condition (9)i sa n
interim participation constraint, as agents may opt out of the mechanism if it does not
meet their reservation utility.
If the underlying functions w and ci, and the prior are smooth and guarantee the
existence of a (dimensionally reducible)solution, then the contract is (optimally) super-
modular implementable. In words, if the principal is in a position to engage in a smooth
revenue-maximizing, and incentive-compatible contract, which allows voluntary par-
ticipation, then she can turn that contract into a supermodular contract that retains
properties (7), (8), and (9), and minimizes the size of the equilibrium set.
8.2 Auctions, bilateral trading, and allocation schemes
Auctions are notorious for lacking complementarities. Consider the auction setting of
Section7. Twobuyers,1and2,haveutilityfunctionv(θi)xi+ti, i = 1 2,wher ev isstrictly
increasing. The allocation-efﬁcient decision rule x∗ is unchanged and equal to (6). Ac-
cording to Proposition 7,23 it is approachable by a sequence of optimally supermodular
implementable decision rules. An example of such a sequence is
x1  (ˆ θ) = c
   
i(ai ˆ θi+bi)/ 
0
1
1+t2 dt +k and x2   = 1−x1   
where constants c, k, ai,a n dbi, i = 1 2, are chosen appropriately. The allocation of the
good under the approximate mechanism is probabilistic. The smaller is  , the larger is
the probability that the highest announcement receives the good. This is illustrated in
Figure 1. The step function represents the efﬁcient allocation rule x1 (assuming agent
2’s type is θ2) and the curve is the approximation.
The transfer t∗
i   to agent i is the expected transfer that i would receive under a
second-priceauction—ifimadethesameannouncementandothersplayedtruthfully—
23I nt h ec a s ew i t hn ≥ 3,l e thi(θi ri) = 1 if θi >r i and 0 otherwise for all i.N o t et h a thi is bounded and
increasing in θi. Now choose ri(θ−i) = max{θj :j  = i}, which is continuous and strictly increasing.424 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Figure 1. Approximate allocation.
plus the optimal supermodular transformation (see (14)a n d( 15)i nAppendix B). The
matrix of complementarities C  can be formed. Since substitutes are unbounded in the
exact case, it is not surprising that they have a lower bound that decreases to inﬁnity
as   → 0 in the approximate case. To compensate for this, the transfers add more com-
plementarities as   vanishes, which leads complementarities to explode on those parts
of the space where reports were already complements. As a consequence, the interval
prediction of the game induced by {x  t∗
 } must be the entire space in the limit. What
is interesting, however, is to ﬁnd the smallest amount of inefﬁciency   for which C  is
still negative-deﬁnite and uniqueness is preserved. This illustrates nicely the forces at
work in Proposition 3. Letting v(θ)= θω with ω>0, it always takes a larger ω to obtain a
smaller  . That is, the more sensitive an agent is to her own type, the higher is the degree
of complementarities that can be compatible with uniqueness; hence the lower   can
be. In the standard case with ω = 1,   ≈  45.W h e nω = 6,   ≈  15. Though uniqueness
fails for some  , the approximate approach is useful when the equilibrium set is small
(Theorem 3).
The results for approximate implementation also apply to public goods situations
where a society of agents decide whether to undertake a public project. The bargaining
mechanismofMyersonandSatterthwaite(1983,p.274)alsosatisﬁestheassumptionsof
Proposition 7 and, as such, the decision rule is approachable by a sequence of optimally
supermodular implementable decision rules. The expected gains from trade along the
sequence converge to the maximal expected gains.
9. Discussion
9.1 A revelation principle for general preferences
I present a revelation principle for supermodular mechanism design. This paper has
limited attention to direct supermodular mechanisms, and they widely apply in quasi-Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 425
linear environments. For general preferences, however, how restrictive are direct mech-
anisms?
To study this question, one has to extend the framework of Section 4 to environ-
mentswithgeneralpreferences,typespaces,andmechanisms(seeMathevet2007). This
generality carries over to the deﬁnition of a supermodular game, because the message
spaces are no longer subsets of the real line, hence an ordering relation—beyond the
usual order on the reals—is required.
For general supermodular design problems, the challenge is to specify an ordered
messagespaceandanoutcomefunctionsothatagentsadoptmonotonebestresponses.
The existence of a revelation principle for supermodular design is a relevant question,
becausethesetofallpossiblemessagespacesandordersonthosespacesissolargethat
thetaskseemsdifﬁcult. Thisprinciplegivesconditionssothat,ifasocialchoicefunction
is supermodular implementable, then there exists a direct-revelation mechanism that
supermodularly implements this social choice function truthfully.
The question pertains to the existence of orders on type spaces that make the (in-
duced) direct game supermodular. Although the resulting orders on type sets may be
very complex, the agents do not need to know them to play the mechanism.24 The de-
signer herself only needs to know that some orderings exist, not their deﬁnition. A proof
of this result can be found in Mathevet (2007).
Theorem 4 (The supermodular revelation principle for ﬁnite types). Let  i be ﬁnite for
all i. If there exists a mechanism ({Mi} g) that supermodularly implements the social
choice function f such that there is an equilibrium m∗(·) for which g◦m∗ = f and m∗
i ( i)
is a lattice, then f is truthfully supermodular implementable.25
According to the supermodular revelation principle, limiting attention to direct
mechanisms amounts to restricting one’s scope to mechanisms where the equilibrium
strategies are lattice-ranged. The proof works by constructing an order on each player’s
type space that is order-isomorphic to the range of her equilibrium strategy.
How tight is the condition imposed on the range of the equilibrium strategies? Ex-
ample 8 in Appendix A suggests that it is somewhat minimally sufﬁcient. The example
presents a supermodular implementable social choice function where this range is not
a lattice and that cannot be supermodularly implemented by any direct mechanism. At
the same time, it shows that the revelation principle fails to hold, in general, for super-
modular mechanism design.
The theorem also states conditions that are veriﬁable a posteriori; it may indeed
be useful to know when a complex mechanism can be replaced with a simpler direct
mechanism. The next corollary identiﬁes situations where direct mechanisms cause no
loss of generality.
24Orders are useful for the analyst, but not for the players, much in the same way as differentiability of
the utility functions.
25General—possibly non-Euclidean—message spaces are endowed with an order and m∗
i ( i) is a lattice
under that order. Mathevet (2007) generalizes the theorem to inﬁnite type spaces.426 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Corollary 4. Let  i be ﬁnite for all i ∈ N. If there is a mechanism ({Mi} g)with totally
ordered message sets that supermodularly implements a social choice function f,t h e nf
is truthfully supermodular implementable.
Ifthedesignerisinterestedonlyinmechanismswherethemessagespacesaretotally
ordered, then she can look at direct mechanisms without loss of generality.
Theorem 4 gives only sufﬁcient conditions for revelation, but in those cases where a
supermodular direct mechanism exists, while the lattice condition is violated, the exis-
tence of an order has little or nothing to do with a revelation principle, because super-
modularity cannot be shown to be transmitted from the indirect mechanism.
9.2 Dominant-strategy versus supermodular implementation
This section highlights the advantage of supermodular implementation over dominant-
strategy implementation. One of the main arguments in favor of supermodular mech-
anisms is the existence of a subset of proﬁles, the interval prediction, which provides a
robust forecast of what agents will play. But equilibrium play is also quite robust un-
der dominant-strategy implementation, although it, too, is not immune to the multiple
equilibrium problem.26
First, strategy proofness, requiring truthtelling to be a dominant-strategy, is not
always possible, even in smooth environments. Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992,
Proposition2andDeﬁnition5)haveshownthatasufﬁcientand“nearly”necessarycon-
dition for strategy-proofness is that the valuation functions and the decision rule satisfy
some single-crossing property. They make an assumption, the one-dimensional con-
densation property, which makes it easier to satisfy that necessary condition.
The next example, inspired by McAfee and McMillan (1991), violates the one-
dimensionalcondensationproperty,andthenecessaryconditionforstrategy-proofness.
So the decision rule is not dominant-strategy implementable, yet it is uniquely super-
modular implementable.
Example 6. Two agents, 1 and 2, whose types are independently and uniformly distrib-
uted in [0 3], exert some effort to produce an observable contribution xi.T h ea m o u n t
of effort ei necessary for x is e1(x θ1) = (3 − θ1)(x1 − x2) + x1 + 9
2 and e2(x θ2) =
(3 − θ2)(x2 + x1). Agent 2 has positive externalities on her counterpart, whereas
agent 1 has negative externalities. Before transfers, the principal has utility w(x θ) =
u(x θ) − cp(x θ),w h e r ecp represents the production costs. The principal’s objective
is to solve (7)s u b j e c tt o( 8) and the ex ante minimum wage Eθ[ti(θ)]≥0 on the econ-
omy. Let function u and the production costs be such that the optimal decision rule
is x∗(θ) = (θ2θ1 − 3/2θ1 θ2 − θ1).27 Agent i’s valuation is Vi(x θi) =− ei(x θi). Propo-
sition 8 in Appendix B applies, so there exist transfers that implement x∗.C o n s t r u c t -
ing optimal transfers from (14)a n d( 15)g i v e st∗
1(ˆ θ) =− 1
2 ˆ θ2
1 − 3ˆ θ1 + 2ˆ θ2 ˆ θ1 + 27
18 and
26Dominant strategies do not rule out the existence of weakly dominated strategies. So agents can very
well play another dominant-strategy equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium whose outcome differs from the
social choice function. Also, learning dynamics may converge to those “unwanted” equilibria. Saijo et al.
(2005) report situations where dominant-strategy implementation has serious drawbacks.
27For example, let u(x θ) = θ2(θ1x1 +x2) and cp(x θ) = (x2
1 +x2




2 +3ˆ θ2 +3ˆ θ2 ˆ θ1 − 675
72 . Since Ki(θi) = θi, γ1(θ2) = θ2 − 1
2,a n dγ2(θ1) = θ1 +1,






is negative-deﬁnite and so truthtelling is the unique equilibrium. ♦
Second, it is well known that dominant-strategy implementation is often incompat-
iblewith balancingbudget(Green and Laffont1979, Laffontand Maskin 1980). The next
example depicts a situation where unique supermodular implementation allows bal-
ancing the budget in a case where dominant strategies cannot. In other words, by weak-
ening the solution concept and putting some structure on the game form, it is possible
to balance the budget and maintain a high likelihood of equilibrium play.
Example 7. In the public goods example of Section 3,l e t 1 =  2 =[ 2 3]. Add a third
player,player3,whosetypeisindependentlydistributedfromtheotherplayers’typesin
 3 =[ 2 3]. Player 3’s valuation function is V3(x θ3) = θ3x −lnx. Letting X =[ 5 10],t h e







iθi)2 −4).B yT h e o r e m3 . 1i n
Laffont and Maskin (1980), the decision rule is dominant-strategy implementable only
if transfers are of the Groves form. However, these transfers cannot balance the budget,
because they violate the necessary condition from Theorem 4.1 in Laffont and Maskin
(1980). Nevertheless, since τi − Ti <  03 and γi > 1 for all i, Proposition 5 implies that x
is uniquely supermodular implementable with a balanced budget. ♦
Ideally, one would like all strategy-proof social choice functions to be uniquely su-
permodular implementable, but such a result is not known.
10. Conclusion
This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the mul-
tiple equilibrium problem by using simple mechanisms that are robust to bounded ra-
tionality. The main motivation behind this approach is the question of the likelihood of
the desired equilibrium outcome. If the design problem satisﬁes the rationality and the
epistemic conditions that ensure equilibrium play, then this question is irrelevant, as
there already exist elaborate mechanisms that solve the multiple equilibrium problem.
However, the more complex the mechanism, the more unlikely it is to satisfy these con-
ditions. In most design problems, these conditions are unrealistic, hence robustness to
less than full rationality is crucial. Yet, this has been neglected in the mechanism design
and implementation literature. This paper presents a possible answer. The methodol-
ogy consists in inducing supermodular games. While supermodularity induces prop-
erties of dominance-solvability, it has stronger theoretical28 and experimental implica-
tions (Camerer 2003, Sefton and Yava¸ s 1996).
28See footnote 5.428 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Beyond the results, this paper brings out basic questions about robustness and the
design problem. Robustness here means the existence of a small subset of strategy pro-
ﬁles that provide a good prediction of what agents will play. In view of Section 6.2,o n e
may wonder whether there is a price to pay for robustness in terms of efﬁciency. The
trade-off appears quite clearly in this framework; sometimes the designer must sacriﬁce
robustness for full efﬁciency or vice versa. In the public goods example, the designer
can modify the expected externality mechanism and secure dominance-solvability at
thepriceofabalancedbudgetorshecanusetheexpectedexternalitymechanismtobal-
ancethebudgetbutshelosesdominance-solvability. Thismayberelatedtothespeciﬁcs
of supermodular implementation, but it is an interesting issue. One may also wonder
whether there is a price to pay for robustness in terms of closeness of the decision rule
implemented. This has obvious implications in terms of efﬁciency. If one accepts some
imprecision around the social choice function, then supermodular implementability
extends, even in its optimal version. This evokes the trade-off between close imple-
mentability and stability raised by Cabrales (1999), regarding the Abreu–Matsushima
(1992, 1994) mechanism.
This paper raises issues that have not been discussed. The multiple equilibrium
problem in supermodular mechanisms suggests an alternative solution, namely strong
implementation. Strong implementation requires all equilibria of the mechanisms to
yield desired outcomes. Healy and Mathevet (2008) show that the Lindahl and the Wal-
rasian social choice functions are uniquely implementable with a contractive mecha-
nism.
Like many Bayesian mechanisms, the present mechanisms are parametric in the
sense that they rely on agents’ prior beliefs. Thus the designer uses information other
than that received from the agents (Hurwicz 1972). It may be interesting to design
nonparametric supermodular mechanisms. This is yet another justiﬁcation for indirect
mechanisms,asnonparametricdirectBayesianmechanismsimposedominant-strategy
incentive compatibility (Ledyard 1978).
Finally, it is important to pursue testing supermodular games. Since this paper pro-
videsageneralframework,itisagoodcandidateforexperimentaltests. Fromapractical
viewpoint, discretizing type spaces may simplify the players’ task of announcing decep-
tions at each round. There are also simple environments with continuous types where
announcing a strategy is equivalent to choosing a real number, such as the leading pub-
lic goods.29
Appendix A
This example shows that the revelation principle fails to hold in general for supermod-
ular Bayesian implementation.
Example 8. Consider two agents, 1 and 2, with type spaces  1 ={ θ1
1 θ2




2}. The prior assigns probability 1/6 to each θ ∈  .L e t X ={ x1     x12} be
29In the public goods example of Section 3, announcing best reply comes down to choosing an intercept
in a compact set (see (1)).Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 429
the outcome space. Agent 1’s preferences are given by utility function u1(xn θ1):
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12
u1(· θ1
1) −10 0 16 −13 −23 3−21 −21 8−19 0 36
u1(· θ2
1) −10 0 16 −21 −21 8−13 −23 3−19 0 36






1 x4 x5 x6
θ2
1 x7 x8 x9
Consider the mechanism   = ({M1 M2} g). Agent 1’s message space is M1 ={ m1 m1
1 
m2
1 m1}.E n d o wM1 with  1 such that m1
1 and m2
1 are unordered, m1 is the greatest el-
ement, and m1 is the smallest element. Agent 2’s message space is M2 ={ m2 m1
2 m2}.
Endow M2 with  2 such that m2  2 m1
2  2 m2. The outcome function g is given by
g(· ·) m2 m1
2 m2




2)f ( θ 1
1 θ2






2)f ( θ 2
1 θ2
2)f ( θ 2
1 θ3
2)
m1 x10 x11 x12









2) = m2.G i v e nu2 is constant, this strategy is a



















Thus 1’s best response m∗
1(·) to m∗









2(·)) is a Bayesian equilibrium and g ◦ m∗ = f. Moreover, for each θ1,
u1(g(m1 m2) θ1) is supermodular in m1 and has increasing differences in (m1 m2).S o
mechanism   supermodularly implements f.
Does this imply that there exists a direct mechanism ({ i} f)that truthfully imple-
ments f in supermodular game form? By means of contradiction, suppose there is such




i (·) = θk
i regardless of i’s true type. Let θT
1 (·) be the truthful strategy for 1
and let θL
1 (·) be constant lying. Note θ1
1(·)< 1 θT
1 (·) θL
1 (·). Since  2 m u s tb eal a t t i c e ,θ1
2
and θ2





1(ˆ θ1(·)  ˆ θ2(·)) = Eθ[u1(f((ˆ θ1(·)  ˆ θ2(·)) θ1)]. Since the direct mechanism
must induce a supermodular game, u
f
1 must satisfy the single-crossing property in430 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
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2(·)) =− 17. Thesingle-crossingprop-
erty is violated. A similar contradiction is reached if, instead, we assume θ1
1 >1 θ2
1.C o n -
sequently, the single-crossing property is violated. The social choice function f is not
truthfully supermodular implementable, although it is supermodular implementable.
This example suggests that the conditions of Theorem 4 are somewhat minimally sufﬁ-
cient. ♦
Appendix B
ProofofTheorem1. Sufﬁciencyisimmediate. Sosupposethatf = (x t)is(Bayesian)
implementable. Since truthtelling is an equilibrium, it implies
Eθ−i[Vi(xi(θi θ−i) θi)]+Eθ−i[ti(θi θ−i)]
≥ Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)]+Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)]
(10)
for all ˆ θi.F o rρi ∈ R,l e t
δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) =
 
j =i
ρi ˆ θi ˆ θj
and deﬁne
tSM
i (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) = δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i)+Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)]−Eθ−i[δi(ˆ θi θ−i)] 
Note that transfers ti and tSM
i have the same expected value: Eθ−i[tSM
i (· θ−i)]=
Eθ−i[ti(· θ−i)].T h u s , (x tSM) is implementable by (10). The payoffs Vi + tSM
i sat-
isfy the continuity requirements, because δi:  → R is continuous and bounded, and
Eθ−i[ti(· θ−i)] is upper semicontinuous. Next, I show that it is possible to choose ρi so
that Vi(· θi) + tSM
i (·) has increasing differences in (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) for all θi. Since substitutes
are uniformly bounded, there exists Ti such that, for all θ  
i ≥ θ 
i and θ  
−i ≥ θ 
−i,
 Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi)− Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ 








for all θi ∈  i.S e tρi > −Ti. It follows from (11)t h a t
 Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi)− Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ 
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or, equivalently,
 Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi)− Vi(θ  






i θ  
j +θ 
iθ 




j) ≥ 0 
Thus, Vi(· θi)+tSM
i (·) has increasing differences in (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) for all θi. Finally, since  i is
a chain, u
f
i is supermodular in ˆ θi(·).  
The next proposition is a standard result, so the proof is omitted (see Proposi-
tion 23.D.2 in Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
Proposition 8. Consider valuation functions and a decision rule x such that
Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)] is continuous in (ˆ θi θi).
(i) If the social choice function f = (x t) is implementable, then for all ˆ θi,
Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)]=− Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i)  ˆ θi)]
+






(ii) Let the decision rule be such that ∂Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)]/∂θi is increasing in ˆ θi for
each θi and i. If transfers t satisfy (12), then f = (x t) is implementable.
Proof of Proposition 2.L e t (x t  ) and (x t ) be any supermodular implementable
social choice functions such that t   t  ∈ T and t    ID t . For any supermodular imple-
mentable social choice function, the induced game has a smallest and a greatest equi-
librium along with a truthful equilibrium in between. Denote the truthtelling strategy
by θT
i (·),i.e., θT
i (θi) = θi,andabusingnotation,letθi andθi beconstantstrategieswhere




i (·)]. Likewise,letGu bethegame
G, where the strategy spaces are restricted from  
 i
i to [θT
i (·) θi]. Since G is supermodu-
lar, by deﬁnition, those modiﬁed games G  and Gu are also supermodular. As such, each
of G  and Gu hasalargestandasmallestequilibrium. Furthermore, G  hasthesameleast
equilibrium as game G, and the largest equilibrium of G  is truthtelling. Likewise, Gu has
the same largest equilibrium as G, and the smallest equilibrium of Gu is truthtelling. De-
ﬁne Ui(ˆ θ(·) t) = Eθ[Vi(xi(ˆ θ(θ)) θi) + ti(ˆ θ(θ))]. I show that (i) Ui(ˆ θ(·) t) has decreasing
differences in (ˆ θi(·) t) in game G ; (ii) Ui(ˆ θ(·) t) has increasing differences in (ˆ θi(·) t)
in game Gu.B yT h e o r e m6i nMilgrom and Roberts (1990), this shows how the extremal
equilibria in each modiﬁed game vary in response to change in transfers with respect to
 ID. In the end, since one extremal equilibrium is always truthtelling in each modiﬁed
game, this shows how the untruthful equilibrium—which is actually an extremal equi-
librium of G—varies with respect to  ID. Before proving (i) and (ii), note that Proposi-
tion 8 implies that all transfers ti such that (x t) is implementable have the same ex-
pected value Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)] up to a constant. Therefore, all implementing transfers can
be written δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) − Eθ−i[δi(ˆ θi θ−i)]+Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)] for some function δi:  → R,432 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
where t is any arbitrary transfers such that (x t) is implementable. First, consider G .
Let δ 
i(·) be the function such that t 
i(ˆ θ) = δ 
i(ˆ θ) − Eθ−i[δ 
i(ˆ θi θ−i)]+Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)] and
deﬁne δ  
i (·) similarly for t  . Choose any deceptions θ  
i (·)>θ  
i(·) and any ˆ θ−i(·) such that
ˆ θj(θj) ≤ θj for all θj and j  = i,s ow ea r ei nG . Note t    ID t  implies δ    ID δ . That is, for
all i and all θ,
δ  
i (θ  
i (θi) θ−i)−δ  
i (θ  
i (θi)  ˆ θ−i(θ−i))−δ  
i (θ 
i(θi) θ−i)+δ  
i (θ 
i(θi)  ˆ θ−i(θ−i))
−δ 
i(θ  
i (θi) θ−i)+δ 
i(θ  









i (θ  
i (θi) θ−i)−δ  
i (θ  






i(θi) θ−i)−δ  
i (θ 






i (θi) θ−i)−δ 
i(θ  












But (13) is equivalent to
Ui(θ  
i (·)  ˆ θ−i(·) t  )+Ui(θ 
i(·)  ˆ θ−i(·) t )−Ui(θ  
i (·)  ˆ θ−i(·) t )−Ui(θ 
i(·)  ˆ θ−i(·) t  ) ≤ 0
for all ˆ θ−i(·).T h a ti s ,Ui(ˆ θ(·) t) has decreasing differences in (ˆ θi(·) t) for each ˆ θ−i(·).I t
follows from Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that the smallest equilibrium in
G  is decreasing in t. The same argument applies to Gu. There, we look at all strategies
such that ˆ θj(θj) ≥ θj for all θj and j  = i. As a result, the sign in (13) is reversed, which
implies Ui(ˆ θ(·) t) has increasing differences in (ˆ θi(·) t) for each ˆ θ−i(·).T h e g r e a t e s t
equilibrium in Gu is thus increasing in t.  
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose f = (x t) is implementable and x is dimensionally re-
ducible. Letting
δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) =−
  ˆ θi
θi







for all ˆ θ ∈  ,Is h o wt h a t
t∗
i (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) = δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i)−Eθ−i[δi(ˆ θi θ−i)]+Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)] (15)
is well deﬁned and that (x t∗) is optimally supermodular implementable. By Proposi-
tion 1, Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)] is well deﬁned and given by (12). Since Vi and hi are C2 on an
open set containing compact set  i, minθi∈ i ∂2Vi(hi(si ri) θi)/∂ri∂si exists, is contin-
uous in (ri si) by the Maximum Theorem, and is bounded; hence it is integrable and
δi:  → R is continuous. Since δi is also bounded, Eθ−i[δi(· θ−i)] is well deﬁned and
so is t∗
i :  → R. The next step is to verify the continuity requirements. As a continu-
o u sf u n c t i o no nac o m p a c ts e t ,δi is uniformly continuous in ˆ θ,a n ds oEθ−i[δ(ˆ θi θ−i)]Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 433
is continuous in ˆ θi. Since Vi is C2, Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i)],d e ﬁ n e da s( 12), is upper semi-
continuous in ˆ θi. Put together, the utility functions satisfy all the continuity require-
ments. Finally, I prove that (x t∗) is optimally supermodular implementable. Note that
Eθ−i[t∗




i (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i)
∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj
=






















Since ri(·) is an increasing function,
− min
θi∈ i








































∂2Vi(xi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) θi)
∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj
≥ 0
for all ˆ θ, θi and j, i,a n ds o(x t∗) is supermodular implementable. Moreover, for all











for all ˆ θ and j, i. This implies that (x t∗) is optimally supermodular implementable.  
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) Since the social choice function is supermodular imple-
mentable, there exist a greatest and a smallest equilibrium in the game induced by
the mechanism. By way of contradiction, suppose that the truthful equilibrium is not
the unique Bayesian equilibrium. Then one of the extremal equilibria must be strictly
greater/smaller than the truthful one. Suppose that the greatest equilibrium, denoted434 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
(θi(·))i∈N, is strictly greater than the truthful equilibrium. That is, for all i, θi(θi) ≥ θi for
almost everywhere θi and there exists N∗  = ∅ such that, for all i ∈ N∗, θi(θi)>θ i for all
θi in some subset of types with positive measure.
I evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition of agent i’s maximization program at the greatest
equilibrium. Then, I bound it from above by an expression that cannot be positive for




Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i(θ−i)) θi)
 
+Eθ−i[ti(ˆ θi θ−i(θ−i))]  (16)
Since Vi, xi,a n dti (by Proposition 8) are continuously differentiable, we can show that
for any deception ˆ θ−i(·), the ﬁrst derivative of (16)w i t hr e s p e c tt oˆ θi is
Eθ−i
 









By assumption, the utility functions and the decision rule produce bounded comple-
ments, so we have
Eθ−i
 















































i θ−i)  ˆ θi)
∂θ 
i













∂Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)
∂ˆ θi
−








Eθj[θj(θj)−θj]+Eθ−i[γi(θ−i)](θi − ˆ θi) 
where the last inequality follows from strong differences.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 435
Since it is optimal for each player i to play θi(θi) for almost everywhere type θi,t h e n
the right-hand side of (20), evaluated at ˆ θi = θi(θi), must be positive for almost every-
where θi and all i.T o s e e w h y , l e t  ∗
i ⊂  i be the set of θi for which the right-hand
side of (20) is strictly negative when playing θi(θi). Note that  ∗
i is measurable by de-
ﬁnition, because the right-hand side of (20) is a measurable function in θi when plug-
ging in θi(θi). If there were a player i for whom  ∗
i had strictly positive measure, then
playing θi(θi) w o u l dl e a d( 17) to be strictly negative for all θi ∈  ∗
i .B u tf o rt y p e si n ∗
i ,
the player can announce types in [θi θi(θi)] and so she would strictly prefer playing
θ∗
i (θi) = θi(θi)−ε1 ∗
i for some small ε.30
Since the right-hand side of (20) is positive for almost everywhere θi when playing











−Eθ−1[γ1(θ−1)] Eθ1[K1(θ1)] ··· Eθ1[K1(θ1)]
Eθ2[K2(θ2)]− Eθ−2[γ2(θ−2)] ··· Eθ2[K2(θ2)]
     
     
   
     






(21) implies the existence of a positive solution w∗ to the system C · w ≥ 0.B u tt h e ni t
must be that w∗TC · w∗ ≥ 0, a contradiction because C is the matrix of complementar-
ities and it is negative-deﬁnite. The same argument applies to show that there is no
equilibrium that is smaller than the truthful equilibrium.
(ii) Let ai and bi be real numbers such that Ki(θi) ≤ aiθi +bi for all θi.D e ﬁ n e
Qi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i(·) θi) = (aiθi +bi)ˆ θi
 
j =i






From now on, only consider strategies where all agents announce types above their true
types (see the proof of Proposition 2 for a similar restriction). Following the same rea-
soning as the one leading to (20), we have
∂Qi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i(·) θi)
∂ˆ θi
≥
∂ui(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i(·) θi)
∂ˆ θi
 
This implies that the game (N { 
 i
i  Qi}) has a greatest equilibrium31 that is larger than
the greatest equilibrium of G (the argument is the same as in the proof of Proposition 2).
However, given the quadratic nature of the payoffs in (N { 
 i
i  Qi}), the greatest equi-














i (·) ∈  i( i) because θi(·) ∈  i( i),s oθ∗
i (·) is a possible choice of deception.
31From (22), this game is obviously supermodular.436 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
From (22) (and since Ki(θi) ≥ 0), i’s best response to ˆ θ−i(·) in (N { 
 i




















From (24), compute the expected value of j’s best response, and note that
Eθj[brj[ˆ θ−j(·)]] = ej[Aj Bj] 
All equilibria in (N { 
 i
i  Qi}) are piecewise afﬁne functions of the form (24) and each is
characterized by a vector (A∗
i  B∗


















To ﬁnd the upper bound on the equilibrium set of G, we need to solve the following













This system has at least one solution where Ai = 1 and Bi = 0 for i = 1     nand it cor-
responds to the truthtelling equilibrium. There also exists a solution that corresponds
to the greatest equilibrium of (N { 
 i
i  Qi}). This solution deﬁnes strategies that bound
the equilibrium set of G from above. To ﬁnish the proof, we apply the same argument,
but we restrict agents to play strategies below truthtelling. That is, we consider only
those strategies where all agents announce types below their true types. We do so, be-
cause the smallest equilibrium of (N { 
 i
i  Qi}) is smaller than the smallest equilibrium
of G. Consider best responses of the form
bri[ˆ θ−i(·)]=
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Asimilarargumenttotheaboveshowsthatthesmallestsolutiontothefollowingsystem












   
Proof of Corollary 3. By assumption, Eθ−i[Vi(xi(ˆ θi θ−i) θi)] is continuous in
(ˆ θi θi).S o Proposition 8 and Theorem 3 imply that (x t∗) is supermodular imple-
mentable, where t∗
i , i = 1     n,i sd e ﬁ n e db y( 15) using (12). By construction, the
mechanism ({ i} (x t∗)) produces bounded complements, where each bound κi on














Since the valuation functions and the decision rule are twice-continuously differen-
tiable, the assumption of strong differences holds. Theorem 3 completes the proof.  










Vk(xk(ˆ θj  ˜ θ−j)  ˜ θk)
 
and, for ρi ∈ R,l e t
δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) =
 
j =i
ρi ˆ θi ˆ θj 
Deﬁne
tBB
i (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) = δi(ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i)−Eθ−i[δi(ˆ θi θ−i)]+E˜ θ−i
  
j =i
















ρj ˆ θjE(θk) 
(28)
First, (x tBB) is implementable, because x is allocation-efﬁcient and
Eθ−i[tBB
i (ˆ θi θ−i)]=E˜ θ−i
  
j =i


































































Hi(θ−i) = 0 
where the last equality follows from balancedness of transfers in the expected external-
ity mechanism. The continuity requirements are clearly satisﬁed, as tBB
i is continuous
in ˆ θ−i for each ˆ θi and is upper semicontinuous in ˆ θi for each ˆ θ−i.N e x t , I s h o w h o w
to pick ρi to have increasing differences in (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i). Since substitutes are uniformly
bounded, there exists Ti such that, for all θ  
i ≥ θ 
i and θ  
−i ≥ θ 
−i,  Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi) −
 Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ 
−i θi) ≥ Ti(θ  




j − θ 
j) for all θi ∈  i.S e t ρi > −Ti. Choose any
θ  
−i ≥−i θ 
−i and θ  
i >θ  
i.F r o m( 28), note that
tBB
i (θ  
i  θ  
−i)−tBB
i (θ  
i  θ 
−i)−tBB
i (θ 





= δi(θ  
i  θ  
−i)−δi(θ  
i  θ 
−i)−δi(θ 





i (·) has increasing differences in (ˆ θi  ˆ θ−i) if for all θi,
 Vi(θ  
i  θ 
i θ  
−i θi)− Vi(θ  






i θ  
j +θ 
iθ 




j) ≥ 0 
That this inequality holds follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 1.  
Proof of Proposition 5.T a k e a n y  >0 such that  <E θ−i[γi(θ−i)]+Ti − τi.D e ﬁ n e
balanced transfers tBB
i as in (28)w i t hρi =− Ti +  . Since substitutes are bounded by Ti,
∂2Vi(· θi)+tBB
i (·)/∂ˆ θi∂ˆ θj ≥  ;h e n c e(x tBB) is supermodular implementable. Since the
valuationfunctionsandthedecisionruleyieldcomplementsthatareboundedby τi,the
mechanism ({ i} (x t∗)) generates complements that are bounded by τi − Ti +  .T h e
matrix of complementarities produced by this mechanism must be negative-deﬁnite,
because τi −Ti + <E θ−i[γi(θ−i)] by assumption. Proposition 3 completes the proof.  
Proof of Proposition 6.L e t O ⊃   be some open set. Deﬁne the extension of x(·)
from   to O.F o ra n yθ ∈ O,l e tN∗(θ) ={ j ∈ N :θj ∈[ θj θj]}, N(θ) ={ j ∈ N :θj <θ j},a n d





θi if i ∈ N∗(θ)
θi if i ∈ N(θ)
θi if i ∈ N(θ).Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Supermodular mechanism design 439
The extension of x(·), denoted xe, is the function xe
(i k)(θ) = x(i k)(p1(θ)     pn(θ)) for
all θ ∈ O,d i m e n s i o nk,a n di ∈ N. Note that xe
(i k) ∈ Lp(O) and it is increasing in ˆ θi be-
cause x(i k) is increasing in ˆ θi. By Theorem 12.10 in Aliprantis and Border (1999), the
space of C2 functions on O is norm dense in Lp(O); hence there exists a sequence
{xn} of C2 functions from O into R such that limn→∞(
 
O |xn (i k) − xe
(i k)|p)1/p = 0 for
all k and i. This implies limn→∞(
 
 |xn (i k) − x(i k)|p)1/p = 0 for all k and all i.M o r e -
over, we can take {xn} such that xn (i k) is increasing in θi on Oi for all k and i.32
Since each  i is compact, and Vi and xn are C2, then they form a continuous family,
∂Eθ−i[Vi(xn (i k)(ˆ θ) θi)]/∂θi = Eθ−i[∂Vi(xn (i k)(ˆ θ) θi)/∂θi] is increasing in ˆ θi on  i,a n d
substitutes are bounded. Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 imply that, for all n,t h e r ee x i s t
tSM
n such that f = (xn tSM
n ) is supermodular implementable.  
Proof of Proposition 7. I start by approximating the functions h(i k):R2 → R and
ri:Rn → R by C2 functions. Then I study the convergence of the resulting composite
function. Let μn denote the Lebesgue measure on Rn. Because type sets are compact
and hi is bounded, Theorems 12.10 and 12.6 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) guarantee
that there exists a sequence {hm
(i k)} of C2 functions that converges pointwise to h(i k) for
μ2-almostall(θi ri).C o n s i d e rf u n c t i o nri(·)foranyi ∈ N. BytheStone–WeierstrassThe-
orem, there exists a sequence of C2-increasing functions {r
q
i } that uniformly converges
























(i k)(θi ri(θ−i))−h(i k)(θi ri(θ−i))
 
 dμn 
The next step is to demonstrate that the second integral on the right-hand side of (29)














(i k)(θi t)−h(i k)(θi t)|dμ×μri 
(30)
32Since xi k is increasing in θi, it is always possible to take the members of the approximating sequence
to be increasing (see Mas-Colell 1974).
33Since ri is increasing, recall that we can take the members of the approximating sequence to be in-
creasing.
34This is indeed not immediate. Suppose limm→∞hm
(i k)(θi ri) = h(i k)(θi ri) for μ2-almost everywhere
points in R2, except on the zero-measure set {(θi r∗
i ):θi ∈ I},w h e r eI is some interval. If ri(θi) = r∗
i for all
θi ∈ I,t h e n
 
 |hm
(i k)(θi ri(θ−i)) − h(i k)(θi ri(θ−i))|dμn does not converge to 0, while we had convergence
μ2-almost everywhere.440 Laurent Mathevet Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
whereμri = μn−1◦r−1
i . OnewaytoproceedistoapplytheRadon–NikodymTheorem. To
this end, I show that μri is absolutely continuous with respect to μ. By way of contradic-
tion, suppose that there is set A such that μ(A) = 0 and μri(A) > 0. This means that, for
each j, there exist countable unions of intervals,
 
kIk












must contain some interval I. Since I ⊂ A and μ(I) > 0,i tm u s tb et h a tμ(A) > 0.T h i si s
a contradiction, so μri is absolutelycontinuous with respect to μ. Clearly, both μri and μ
are (totally) ﬁnite on ri( −i). By the Radon–Nikodym Theorem, there exists f on ri( −i)
such that μri(A) =
 












(i k)(θi t)−h(i k)(θi t)|f(t)dμ2 
(31)
Since |hm
(i k)(θi t)− h(i k)(θi t)|f(t)is integrable and dominated almost everywhere by
Hf(t) for H>0 sufﬁciently large, we can apply the Bounded Convergence Theorem to









(i k) (θi ri(θ−i)) − h(i k)(θi ri(θ−i))|dμn <
1/2m.
• Since each hα(m) is C2, we know that h
α(m)
(i k) (θi r
q
i (θ−i)) converges uniformly to
h
α(m)







i (θ−i))−hi(θi ri(θ−i))|dμn < 1/2m.




i (·))} so constructed, the left-hand side of (29)i s
less than 1/m for all m and thus it converges to hi(· ri(·)) in L1 norm. In other words,
there is a sequence of dimensionally reducible decision rules {xm
i } that converges to xi
in L1 space. Each xm is implementable, because ∂Vi(xi θi)/∂θi is increasing in xi and
xm
i (·) is increasing in ˆ θi for each m. Theorem 3 completes the proof.  
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